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Economic Perspective 1 
THE INVESTMENT TRUST DISCOUNT 
by Paul Draper, Department of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Strathclyde 
The British Coal Pension Funds' bid for Globe 
Investment Trust, although not directly involving 
Scottish investment trusts, reflects an ever 
present threat to a substantial part of the 
Scottish fund management sector. Scottish fund 
managers account for more than a third of the UK 
investment trust industry and investment trusts 
represent the core business of many Scottish fund 
managers. In recent years fund managers have 
diversified into the management of pension funds 
and unit trusts but the investment trust business 
continues to provide a steady, dependable income 
and so supplies funds for expansion in other 
areas. This dependence on investment trust 
business makes it important to examine the reasons 
for the Globe bid and identify the processes at 
work with a view to taking action, if necessary, 
to protect the stream of income generated by the 
trust business. 
The immediate cause of the bid for Globe lay in 
the acquisition of an additional five per cent 
shareholding by British Coal Pension Fund but the 
fundamental cause lies in the huge shareholdings 
in the trusts accumulated by pension funds and 
insurance companies, shareholdings which sit 
uneasily with the basic purposes and objectives of 
investment trusts. Investment trusts grew up to 
supply diversification and management to small 
investors. The declared objective of the first 
investment trust, the Foreign and Colonial 
Government Trust, was to give the investor of 
moderate means the same advantages enjoyed by 
large capitalists by investing in stocks, a 
pattern that has been followed by the majority of 
investment trusts at least until very recent 
years. Investment trusts offer small investors 
both a reduction in risk by their ability to 
diversify, and management expertise that is 
otherwise difficult to obtain. These services are 
of value to investors who cannot achieve the same 
ends as cheaply by any other means. From its early 
beginnings the rising real income and wealth of 
the middle classes led to the prolonged expansion 
of the industry with a stream of new entrants and 
the provision of diversification and management 
services to an increasing circle of investors. 
The expansion of the industry came to a halt 
however, as a consequence of the dramatic changes 
that have occurred in the market for investments 
over the last thirty years. Investment trusts now 
have to compete against a wide range of investment 
institutions offering products many of which have 
been designed to be simple and appeal to the 
small, less well informed investor. Such products 
are actively marketed and advertised in ways 
sometimes unavailable to investment trusts. Even 
more fundamental perhaps has been the difference 
in tax treatment between different savings 
mediums. In particular, pension funds are treated 
more generously for tax purposes than other 
investment vehicles with the result that, in 
general, individuals have switched from holding 
equities directly to holding them through 
institutions, particularly pension funds. Indirect 
holding of shares through intermediaries is more 
tax efficient for investors and in the long term 
such powerful economic forces are crucial. The 
consequence of these factors for the investment 
trust industry over time have been dramatic. Much 
of the traditional clientele supplied by 
investment trusts has been seduced away by the tax 
advantages of pension funds and the simplicity, 
marketing and ease of acquisition of unit trusts. 
At the same time the management skills of the 
trusts have been in much less demand. When the 
first investment trust was formed, overseas 
investment was a highly risky and specialised 
activity. By the 1960's foreign investment was 
awkward because of the dollar premium but improved 
communications had made overseas investment much 
easier. The value added by investment trust 
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management was much smaller. The result was a 
reduction in the demand for the expertise of 
investment trust managers. Unfortunately, whilst 
expansion of the investment trust industry is easy 
since existing trusts can issue new shares or new 
trusts can be formed, the contraction of the 
industry is more problematic. Investment trusts 
are companies with directors and employees so that 
liquidation (or similar) implies painful 
readjustment of incomes and expenditures. 
Moreover, since their assets are not reduced by a 
fall in demand for the services trusts provide 
there is no compelling reason for termination. In 
consequence, rapid reduction in the size of the 
industry to reflect reduced demand for 
diversification and management is almost 
impossible. 
The difficulty attached to reducing the quantity 
of investment trust shares in existence, coupled 
with a fall in demand from personal sector 
investors as these investors secured 
diversification and management expertise from 
other investment products, could have only one 
result; a fall in the share price of the trusts. 
Such a fall is necessary to attract (informed) 
investors to hold investment trust shares in their 
portfolios. The share price of an investment trust 
is determined by the supply and demand for the 
trust's shares in the same way as the share price 
of any other company. The distinguishing 
characteristic of investment trusts is that the 
value of the underlying assets of the trust are 
known. Provided investment trusts offer valuable 
services to (uninformed) investors the value of 
the investment trusts own shares exceeds the value 
of the underlying assets. The 'premium' is not 
large since diversification is cheap to obtain and 
few managers have special investment skills that 
justify a large premium. The possibility of 
replicating trusts also acts to keep premiums 
down. 
If investment trusts do not offer valuable 
services to (uninformed) investors the price of 
the trusts will fall. In the simplest case when 
investment trusts can be liquidated immediately, 
the maximum fall in share price will be to the 
value of the trust's assets less the costs of 
liquidation. The costs of liquidation are 
generally small and rarely more than ten per cent 
of the market value of the trust and yet we 
observe that investment trust prices frequently 
stand at more than a ten per cent 'discount' to 
their asset values. The cause is the difficulty in 
liquidating or otherwise reducing the number of 
trusts and hence the amount of diversification 
services on offer to investors. The investment 
trust's own fund managers see their trusts as a 
continuing entity offering useful services to 
investors and to this end they actively resist 
closure. Interlocking directorships, long 
management contracts, cross shareholdings and 
special classes of capital are some of the many 
ways that predators can be halted. The difficulty 
in reducing the number of trusts has a consequence 
for the pricing of investment trust shares. The 
price is not a random phenomena determined in 
isolation. The price is set relative to other 
securities in the market. In particular, investors 
in any company expect to be offered a return that 
relates to the market risk assumed. If an 
investment trust imposed no management charges 
whatsoever and offered no value added to investors 
(the managers had no special management abilities) 
the return of the trust would exactly correspond 
to its market risk. However, investment trusts 
charge for their services. These charges reduce 
the return below that appropriate for the risk 
assumed. Indeed, since the management are 
difficult to displace, on acquisition of an 
investment trust the investor can be confident of 
having to pay management charges for years into 
the future. The result is that, on average, the 
market value of the trust falls by the capitalised 
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value of these costs. The overall result is, in 
general, a sizeable discount to net asset value 
(NAV). 
At the same time however, the trust sector does 
adjust to changed circumstances with a steady, if 
sometimes slow, stream of mergers, takeovers, 
liquidations and unitisations. For any investor 
purchasing an investment trust there is a positive 
probability of early exit as a result of corporate 
change affecting the existence of the trust. When 
such a change comes about the discount is greatly 
reduced or removed, and market prices must reflect 
such possibilities. The probability of structural 
readjustment acts to reduce the discount. 
In short, in the absence of (uninformed) investors 
wishing to buy diversification and management 
services investment trust shares offer a return 
commensurate to the risk taken on. If the managers 
have particular investment skills the additional 
return they can generate more than offsets the 
charges involved and the shares stand at a premium 
to net asset value (NAV). If the managers do not 
have any such skills, the return on the trust's 
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assets after meeting management costs are too low 
to support a price close to NAV and the price 
falls. The extent of this fall is affected by the 
perceived difficulty of removing the managers and 
distributing the assets of the fund to the 
shareholders. 
If this view of investment trusts is correct what 
implications does it have for Scottish fund 
managers? If we rule out liquidation and takeover 
at the outset since these do not benefit Scottish 
fund managers (although they may benefit Scottish 
investors) three possibilities are apparent; to 
offer valuable investment management services to 
investors; to coax back into purchasing investment 
trust shares private sector investors who are 
willing to pay (through a reduction in returns) 
for diversification and management; and to reduce 
the discount by reducing the costs associated with 
management. 
Aspects of these policies can already be seen at 
work. Over the last year there has been a flood of 
new, specialised investment trust issues offering 
investors particular management skills such as 
investment in Thailand. Unfortunately, any such 
move to provide specialised management is likely 
to fail. If the overseas stock market in question 
takes off then UK institutions will find it 
desirable to develop their own skills in this 
area. If the market fails to develop the 
investment trust will remain small and may well 
not be economic. The problem is that investment 
management is in general a low value added 
business. Unusual investment skills are difficult 
to develop and attempts to offer specialist 
services to institutional investors by investing 
in (easily) tradeable assets is almost certainly 
doomed to failure. To provide value added fund 
managers need to specialise in activities and 
investments that are not easily replicated. 
Venture capital may be one such area. 
The second possibility is to woo the private 
investor. This is already a feature of investment 
trust policy. The introduction of savings schemes 
to encourage the purchase of investment trust 
shares and the marketing of trusts through 
intermediaries paying commission for sales of 
shares has almost certainly resulted in the 
reduction of the average level of the investment 
trust discount. As informed institutional 
investors perceive a change in the market for the 
trusts and the return into the market of the 
traditional investment trust clientele they 
recognise that the price of the trust will rise. 
The result is a higher probability of early exit 
at or near NAV and consequently the discount 
narrows. However, whilst the outlook for the 
trusts has improved a sizeable discount remains 
and as such will continue to make investment 
trusts an attractive target. For the discount to 
shrink further it is necessary for informed 
investors to be convinced that the proportion of 
private sector shareholders will continue to 
expand rapidly. This is not impossible. The growth 
of the unit trust market shows what is possible 
but it must be remembered that until the life 
assurance companies moved into the unit trust 
market in a big way in recent years with their 
very considerable marketing muscle, the unit trust 
industry was smaller than the investment trust 
industry. Use of financial intermediaries and 
improved marketing whether by specialisation, 
innovation or advertising can certainly help 
investment trusts, but it is to be doubted if it 
is enough in the short to medium term to reduce 
the discount to a level low enough to deter all 
predators. 
A reduction in management costs is the third 
possibility. A direct reduction in management 
charges in unlikely. The trend in recent years has 
been upwards and with the costs imposed by 
increased regulatory requirements is unlikely to 
fall. However, it would be possible to create more 
competitive conditions in the investment trust 
industry by reducing the length of management 
contracts, introducing periodic reviews by the 
shareholders of whether the trust should continue, 
and reducing wasteful turnover. An objective of 
all investment trust directors should be to 
identify the interests of the trust's fund 
managers with the interests of the investment 
trust's shareholders. One possibility might be the 
issue of options to fund managers contingent on 
narrowing the discount. Another might be partial 
payment to fund managers in deferred investment 
trust shares with deferment dependent on the level 
of the discount. Such measures are unlikely to be 
popular with fund managers. Many fund managers 
probably prefer to take their chances and hope (or 
try and ensure) that their trusts are not taken 
over. The assault on Globe suggests that this may 
be wishful thinking. There remain more assets in 
the sector than private sector investors wish to 
hold. Until more such investors are attracted into 
holding investment trust shares causing a 
reduction in the discount investment trusts will 
continue to make an attractive target for 
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predators. 
Although not always possible one strategy for 
beleaguered fund managers is to unitise their 
investment trusts. Unitisation generally involves 
significant early redemptions but despite this it 
is an attractive option for the fund managers 
because it enables them, in general, to greatly 
increase charges and to retain funds under 
management without fear of predators. The 
disadvantage is that it involves accepting that 
marketing and not investment skills are the key to 
success. And yet, this is precisely the direction 
in which investment trusts must move if they are 
to succeed in reducing the discount by appealing 
to uninformed investors. The need is for 
investment trusts to recognise that they are 
competing in an expanding but very competitive 
savings market. If they are to be successful they 
must develop their marketing and distribution 
skills. Until they do the discount is likely to 
persist and trusts will be attractive victims for 
predators. Diatribes against pension funds are not 
the answer. Nor is statutory proscription of 
investment trust takeovers. The discount has to be 
reduced and the Scottish trusts should concentrate 
their energies on actively marketing themselves to 
the private sector. 
Footnotes 
1. It was thought, for example, that investment 
trusts could not advertise because of the ban 
on companies promoting their own shares under 
the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act. 
2. It would be more accurate to distinguish 
between informed and uninformed investors 
where the informed investors are typically 
institutions and realise that diversification 
can be cheaply achieved and that management 
is generally of limited value in contrast to 
uninformed investors who have no such 
knowledge. 
3. This is clearly illustrated by the recent 
furore over Globe Investment Trust. One 
might be forgiven at times for believing that 
the whole future of the investment trust 
industry was at stake and that millions of 
small investors were going to be deprived of 
a home for their assets. Whilst Globe has a 
large number (42,000) of shareholders small 
investors do not own the majority of shares 
and could find an equally attractive home in 
many of the 200 or so trusts that remain. 
4. The extent of these costs cannot be estimated 
with certainty since current management 
charges are only one aspect of management 
costs. Hidden management costs arise from 
excessive turnover and poor dealing whilst 
the general rise in charges over the last ten 
years may be expected to continue. 
5. The discount will also be affected by 
uncertainties over the valuation of assets. 
The extent of these uncertainties is 
generally small but the difficulties are 
illustrated by the augmentation of Globe's 
valuation with the addition of £44 million 
for its fund management operations. In the 
absence of a market price the value of these 
assets remains uncertain and open to 
argument. 
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